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the issue. Even from a Dillon’s rule analysis, the power to sue and be sued is an essential
component of juridical personality regardless of whether the state is the object of the litigation.
B. Standing to sue.
Here again I would argue that federal courts should defer to state law on this issue. However I am
aware of USSCT caselaw that generally denies standing to state taxpayers pressing federal claims
even when a state court is willing to entertain such claims. I do not have the will or the expertise
to explore the attenuated subtleties of Federal caselaw on this issue but it should be addressed.
C. Justiciability
Once more the shape and thrust of federal case law are beyond my competence. But it is my
recollection that federalism concerns are part of the legal landscape concerning this doctrine.
D. Sovereignty and related concerns.
Hunter is a case involving a challenge to a jury-rigged statute that essentially forced the City of
Allegheny to merge with the city of Pittsburgh. There is a persistent body of USSCT caselaw from
Coyle v. Smith to the cases surveyed by Mosk, J. in the Sacramento LAFCO case,838 P.2d 1198,
that tells me that whether the plaintiff in that case was Mrs. Hunter or the City Of Allegheny, the
claim would have been rejected. Coyle v. Smith is, of course, not squarely decided under the 10th
Amendment,although it is cited in subsequent 10th Amendment cases. But Cameron County
Water District is-no access to protections of Federal municipal bankruptcy law without express
consent of state statutory law.
There are also 11th Am issues involving caselaw denying state employees a federal forum in
which to press their claims against their state employer.
E. Merits
As previously observed under D, established Federal doctrine does not protect local government
units from boundary change decisions mandated by the state legislature. Only bondholders (Port
of Mobile v. Watson) and victims of racial gerrymander (Gomillion) are constitutionally protected. I
am not so sure that body of case law is unsound – although a doctrinaire marxist would not be
surprised by the privileged status of bondholders under the Contracts clause. I am more troubled
by the failure of federal law to recognize that local government units have property rights against
state uncompensated takings or can make contracts with the state that bind the state.
All holders of the right to divert river water were compensated by
the state of New Jersey- except Newark and Trenton- even though those cities had purchased
diversion rights from private sector entities Hendrik Hartog and others have documented that
municipal corporations in some states were recognized as possessing property interests held in
the entity’s proprietary capacity. State cases recognizing the proprietary capacity distiction would
seem to fit within Erie. I could, as an aging bore, go on citing cases, but the point is that the case
for applying Federal constitutional norms to state-local relations calls for a clause by clause
selective incorporation approach.
F. Concluding remarks.
It is my view that the heart of the conceptual problem lies exactly where Hartog and Horwitz and
others, have indicated – the strong dichotomy between public and private. Adherence to that
dichotomy led to the differentiation between municipal corporartions and private corporations. The
former even though juridical persons were not. through the prism of sovereignty crafted by lawyers
and judges seen as constitutional right bearers, whereas the latter possess a nearly full measure
of the protections afforded “persons”. The result has been a reign of state legislative hegemony
over the activities and affairs of local government whose negative consequences in Pennsylvania,
for example, are shared by municipalties of every size. (For thorough documentation ,see the
website of 10,000 Friends of Pennsylvania.)
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Constitutionalizing Local Politics
 Kathleen Morris has written a bold and exciting article on an issue that deserves more attention
than it has received: local governments’ role in constitutional enforcement. Rather than engage the
merits of the article’s central doctrinal argument—that Erie Railroad v. Tompkins effectively
overruled Hunter v. Pittsburgh—this short response makes a brief foray into what Morris calls the
“normative debate over local constitutional enforcement.” Specifically, it offers a few thoughts on
how increased local involvement in constitutional enforcement might change the political and
constitutional landscape.
Such a changed role would, by definition, raise new challenges as well as new opportunities for
local government, and the former may be more significant than Morris’s article suggests. For
example, she argues that perhaps localities are “uniquely competent, rather than uniquely
incompetent, to interpret the Constitution,”1 because they are in effect the places where the
constitutional rubber meets the real-life road. But local governments’ responsibility for applying
laws that might raise constitutional problems—Morris points to the announcement of time, place,
and manner restrictions on speech and the creation of strip-search policies2—simply highlights the
stakes of constitutional issues at the local level, not necessarily the desirability of local government
officials’ role in resolving them.
This potential shortcoming is only reinforced by the fact that—holding aside extraordinary counter-
examples such as San Francisco’s role in the same-sex marriage debate—voters generally seem
to elect municipal leaders precisely because they have expertise in issues like . . . well, like real-
life roads (not to mention schools, law enforcement, zoning, and the like). Since few city council
members, selectmen, or aldermen are elected on the basis of any particular constitutional vision, it
is unclear how “welcoming localities into constitutional cases as plaintiffs would democratize
constitutional litigation.”3 Moreover, the most important actors in a post-Hunter world of local
government constitutional enforcement would presumably be city attorneys and corporation
counsel—roughly the municipal equivalent of state attorneys general—only some of whom are
directly accountable to voters. How, then, are any of these officials well-positioned to democratize
constitutional litigation?
Of course, all of that could change. Local government officials undoubtedly could articulate
constitutional visions, and one implication of Morris’s argument is that overruling Hunter would
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incentivize them to do just that. Perhaps if local government were allowed to engage in
constitutional enforcement, more local government officials would be subject to election. And more
city attorneys might start taking public positions on substantive constitutional issues like prayer in
local schools or free speech in municipal parks.
But there are reasons to doubt that the constitutionalization of local politics would be a good thing.
It could lead to significant mission creep, distracting local government officials from traditional and
vital functions like the nitty-gritty operations of schools and parks themselves. Moreover, it’s not
entirely clear that a politically savvy city attorney would always argue in favor of the interests of
the city qua city. There are undoubtedly many situations in which an ambitious attorney’s political
career could be advanced by arguing a politically popular constitutional claim that would limit city
power and autonomy—against municipal authority to regulate guns, for example, or for prayer in
local schools.
Perhaps the political process would prevent that, too. Maybe voters simply wouldn’t support
candidates who prioritize constitutional claims over roadwork, or who sacrifice the city’s interests
for some other legal or political goal. But the story would be complicated at the very least.
Overruling Hunter could radically alter the role of the city attorney, and that transformation’s
implications for the internal structure of the city are unclear. Presumably a higher proportion of city
attorneys would be chosen by election than by appointment, in order to give voice to the people’s
constitutional vision; many city attorneys would use their positions as stepping stones to higher
office, as state attorneys general occasionally do now; and conflicts might well arise between bold
city attorneys, mayors, and city councils, as occasionally happens between attorneys general and
Governors.4 The internal structure of local government, in other words, would need to shift to
accommodate this new weight.
Over time, increased local constitutional enforcement could also prompt an unexpected shift in
cities’ civic character. A municipality’s vigorous litigation in support of, say, school prayer, could
act as a signaling device—a local constitutional flag—to prospective residents. Even as the city’s
advocacy of its constitutional vision attracted likeminded citizens, it could drive out those more
comfortable with the status quo. Rather than enriching public discourse, increased local
engagement with polarizing constitutional issues might contribute to urban spaces’ homogenization
and the accompanying erosion of cities’ capacity to nurture diverse communities.5
To be clear, these are musings on the implications of Morris’s article, not an effort to evaluate its
powerful and provocative central argument. As local governments shoulder tremendous burdens
with diminished resources, serious reflection is needed on their place in our constitutional
landscape. That the article facilitates such engagement is, hopefully, evidence of the influence it
will have on discussions about the proper role of local government in political and constitutional
life.
1 Kathleen S. Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, at 47 (Draft, Aug. 2011) (forthcoming in 47 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev.).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 44
4 See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General & Lessons from the Divided
Executive, 115 Yale L.J. 2446, 2453-55 (2006).
5 See Gerald Frug, City Making: Building Communities without Building Walls 138-42 (1999).
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